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Abstract
This paper builds a two-country, two-sector (polluting, nonpolluting)
trade model with directed technical change, examining whether unilateral
environmental policies can ensure sustainable growth. The polluting good
generates more or less emissions depending on its relative use of a clean and
a dirty input. I show that a unilateral policy combining clean research subsi-
dies and a trade tax can ensure sustainable growth, while unilateral carbon
taxes alone increase innovation in the polluting sector abroad and gener-
ally cannot ensure sustainable growth. Relative to autarky and exogenous
technical change respectively, the mechanisms of trade and directed techni-
cal change accelerate environmental degradation either under laissez-faire or
with unilateral carbon taxes, yet both help reduce environmental degradation
under the appropriate unilateral policy. I characterize the optimal unilateral
policy analytically and numerically using calibrated simulations. Knowledge
spillovers have the potential to reduce the otherwise large welfare costs of
restricting policy to one country only.
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1. Introduction
Despite the signature of the Kyoto protocol in 1997, annual carbon diox-
ide (CO2) emissions increased by 39% between 1997 and 2010. Meanwhile,
climate negotiations have stalled and no global agreement is in sight. In re-
sponse, several countries have undertaken unilateral environmental policies
with varying degrees of ambition and success. For instance, the European
Union implemented a cap-and-trade system (EU ETS) in 2005 which covers
around 45% of the EUs greenhouse gas emissions. However, such policies
generate a pollution haven e¤ect, as the production of tradable and polluting
goods moves to countries with laxer policies, which leads to an increase in
their emissions. Could unilateral policies nevertheless achieve the necessary
reduction in CO2 emissions? If so, how should they be designed? These ques-
tions are fundamentally about the economys long-run behavior. Over the
time period relevant to climate change, comparative advantages evolve with
innovation, which itself responds to environmental policies. Yet, the eco-
nomic literature on unilateral environmental policies has largely ignored the
role played by innovation. This paper builds a trade model featuring directed
technical change and a global pollution externality, and thereby highlights
the crucial role that innovation plays in the positive and normative analysis
of unilateral climate change policies.
More formally, I consider a dynamic RicardoHeckscherOhlin model
with two countries, North and South, and two sectors, polluting and non-
polluting. The North represents countries willing to implement an environ-
mental policy, and the South, countries that are not a division which need
not fall along the lines of developed versus developing countries. The pollut-
ing good represents the tradable goods with a high CO2 emission intensity,
typically energy-intensive sectors. It is produced using clean inputs (e.g.,
renewable and nuclear energy or bioplastics) and/or dirty inputs (e.g., fossil
fuel energy or traditional petroleum products). Innovation is undertaken in
both countries by prot-maximizing rms that hire scientists. It can be di-
rected at the nonpolluting sector, or, within the polluting sector, at clean or
dirty technologies. For most of the analysis, innovation is completely local.
In laissez-faire, the allocation of innovation favors the exporting sector
and therefore reinforces comparative advantage over time. This results from
a market size e¤ect: a country exports the good that it produces relatively
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more, such that the market for innovation in that sector is relatively larger.
As in Acemoglu et al. (2012a; henceforth AABH), the allocation of innova-
tion within the polluting sector exhibits path-dependence, also because of a
market size e¤ect (a more advanced technology has a larger market which
increases the prots of subsequent innovators). If clean technologies are ini-
tially less advanced than dirty ones, the laissez-faire equilibrium leads the
economy toward an environmental disaster, as the quality of the environ-
ment falls below a critical threshold. In other words, economic growth is not
sustainable. The paper analyzes whether this disaster can be prevented by
specic policies in the North only, and doing so, makes two important points.
First, carbon taxes are generally unable to prevent an environmental dis-
aster and may even be counterproductive. A carbon tax in the North leads
to a reallocation of some of the polluting goods production from the North
to the South (a static pollution haven e¤ect). It cannot prevent an envi-
ronmental disaster if the South initially had a comparative advantage in the
polluting sector, since then, the South specializes further in the polluting
sector and its emissions keep growing. Moreover, because reallocating pro-
duction goes hand in hand with reallocating innovation, a Northern carbon
tax actually increases dirty Southern innovations (a dynamic pollution haven
e¤ect) and thereby may accelerate environmental degradation.
Second, a temporary industrial policy, which combines clean research sub-
sidies and a trade tax, may prove to be more e¤ective. Such a policy can
help the North develop a comparative advantage in the polluting sector while
making that sector cleaner at the same time. This ensures that emissions
eventually start decreasing in both countries. If the initial environmental
quality is high enough, an environmental disaster can be averted. Impor-
tantly, directed technical change is essential for this result; with exogenous
technical change, unilateral policies in the North could still fail to prevent a
disaster when the South initially has a su¢ ciently large comparative advan-
tage in the polluting sector.
The optimal unilateral policy can be decentralized through a carbon tax
and research subsidies in the North along with a trade tax on the polluting
good. When the social planner values equally consumption in the North
and the South, the trade tax typically takes the form of a tari¤ and then
of an export subsidy. Its expression reects two aims of the social planner:
reducing emissions in the South and redirecting Southern innovation toward
the nonpolluting sector. To illustrate the results, I conduct a numerical
exercise where, in accordance with the literature, the South corresponds to
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countries with no binding constraints under the Kyoto protocol. This exercise
shows that, even though avoiding a disaster is possible, the welfare costs from
not being able to intervene in the South may be very large. It also highlights
the double-edged nature of trade and directed technical change. Relative
to autarky and exogenous technical change respectively, the mechanisms of
trade and directed technical change accelerate environmental degradation
either under laissez-faire or with unilateral carbon taxes, yet both help reduce
environmental degradation under the appropriate unilateral policy.
Finally, the model is enriched by including knowledge spillovers. Unilat-
eral carbon taxes may still fail to prevent an environmental disaster; whereas
a combination of clean research subsidies and a carbon tari¤ can do so for
su¢ ciently high initial environmental quality. In this scenario, however, the
di¤usion of knowledge can ensure a switch toward clean innovation in the
South; hence an environmental disaster can be prevented even though the
South still specializes in the polluting good. In addition, the welfare costs
from not being able to intervene in the South are much lower.
This paper can be interpreted as a green version of the infant industry
argument,which claims that trade can be detrimental to growth if it leads
countries to specialize in sectors with poor development prospects (Krug-
man,1981, Young, 1991, Matsuyama, 1992). Here as well, a country risks
specializing in the wrongsector, not because that sector o¤ers poor growth
prospects, but because this country cannot prevent the environmental exter-
nality associated with production in that sector. The idea that free trade may
amplify comparative advantages and that a temporary trade policy could per-
manently reverse the trade pattern was previously touched on by Krugman
(1987), and Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 8).1
It has long been recognized that, in an open world, the pollution haven
e¤ect hampers the e¤ectiveness of unilateral policies for reducing world pollu-
tion (Pethig, 1976). Empirical evidence is reported by Copeland and Taylor
(2004) or Broner, Bustos and Carvalho (2012). Markusen (1975) and Hoel
(1996) show that the optimal instrument for addressing the pollution haven
e¤ect is a tari¤. In the context of global warming, where the pollutant
1Krugmans (1987) is based on learning-by-doing, and Grossman and Helpmans (1991)
model features endogenous growth in one sector only. A few papers have built models with
trade and directed technical change; examples include Acemoglu (2003), who studies the
impact of trade on the skill bias of technological change, and Gancia and Bonglioli (2008),
who show that trade amplies international wage di¤erences.
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(CO2) enters at several stages of the production process, several papers use
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to track carbon through the
global economy; in this way they determine the pattern of trade and compute
the carbon leakage rate (the rate at which emissions abroad increase after a
domestic reduction). Developed countries are net carbon importers, which
justies the focus of the paper on the case where the South has a comparative
advantage in the polluting sector: Atkinson et al. (2011) nd that the net US
imports of carbon from China in 2004 amounted to 244 million tons of CO2
or 0.9 percent of total world emissions that year; the OECD STAN database
estimates that for OECD countries net CO2 imports represent 12.6% of CO2
emissions from production. Elliott et al. (2010) compute a carbon leak-
age rate of 20 percent from a reduction in Annex I countries the countries
with binding constraints under the Kyoto protocol and show that border
tax adjustments eliminate half of it.2 There are comparatively few empirical
studies. Aichele and Felbermayr (2012) nd that countries which committed
to the Kyoto protocol reduced domestic CO2 emissions by about 7%, but did
not change their total CO2 consumption. While this literature has focused
on static models, the novelty of the present paper is to incorporate dynamic
aspects. This comes at the expense of a more detailed model of world trade
(as in CGE models) and of a study of the strategic interactions between
countries (as in Copeland and Taylor, 2005).
A growing literature has shown the importance of taking into account
directed technical change when designing climate change policies. On the
empirical side, Popp (2002) shows that an increase in energy prices leads
to more energy-saving innovation; similar results are found by Newell, Ja¤e
and Stavins (1999) in the air conditioner industry and by Hassler, Krusell
and Olovsson (2012) using macroeconomic US data. Aghion et al. (2012)
focus on the car industry and establish that an increase in fuel prices leads
to clean innovation at the expense of dirty innovation and that there is path
dependence in clean versus dirty innovation ndings in line with the results
reported here. On the theoretical side, several papers have integrated di-
rected technical change in the study of climate change policies; here, I build
on AABH.3 The nal good in AABH and the polluting sector in this paper
2Among others, Babiker and Rutherford (2005); Böhringer, Fisher and Rosendahl
(2010); and Böhringer, Carbon and Rutherford (2011) nd similar results.
3Earlier work on the environment and directed technical change includes Bovenberg
and Smulders (1995) Goulder and Schneider (1999), van der Zwaan et al. (2002) , Popp
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are produced similarly with a clean and a dirty input, which are substitutes
for each other. Yet, AABH focus on a closed economy and does not feature
a non-polluting sectoras in this paper. Therefore, in AABH carbon taxes
can still prevent an environmental disaster by redirecting innovation towards
clean technologies. This result, which would still hold if there was only one
country, collapses in an open economy, as carbon taxes are often insu¢ cient
and sometimes counterproductive. Acemoglu, Aghion and Hémous (2014)
present a simple North-South extension of AABH, where countries trade a
polluting and a non-polluting goods. Crucially, the two goods are assumed
to be substitute and there is no innovation which can make the polluting in-
put less polluting (therefore the two goods are similar to the clean and dirty
inputs in this set-up). Besides the South cannot innovate even if it reaches
the technological frontier. In that paper, carbon taxes necessarily reduce the
amount of emissions in the long-run (contrary to here), but may be unable
to prevent an environmental disaster (yet this result rests on the assumption
that Southern imitators coordinate on a bad equilibrium). The present paper
reverses these assumptions, which provides a more realistic and richer frame-
work. Di Maria and Smulders (2004) and Di Maria and van der Werf (2008)
also study the allocation of innovation between an energy-intensive sector
and a nonenergy-intensive sector in a directed technical change model with
trade, but they also overlook that innovations within the energy-intensive
sector could either reduce or increase pollution.4
Finally, this paper relates to the large integrated assessment models
(IAMs) literature which builds dynamic models of the economy and the cli-
mate to evaluate the impact of climate change policies on welfare. This
literature has been pioneered in particular by Nordhaus (1994), who devel-
oped the DICE model for a world economy, and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000),
who developed the RICE model for a multi-regions economy. It aims at de-
riving (quantitatively) the optimal policy, which generally takes the form of
a carbon tax schedule (see, for instance, Golosov et al., 2014, for a recent
treatment, or Krusell and Smith, 2009, for an ongoing project with highly
(2004) and Grimaud and Rouge (2008). See also Acemoglu et al. (2012b).
4In Di Maria and Smulders (2004), the North develops technologies and the South
imitates. Opening up to trade leads to a reallocation of innovation toward the sector
that the North exports. Carbon leakage is reduced when the goods are substitutes and
amplied otherwise. In Di Maria and van der Werf (2008), both countries innovate and
carbon leakage is always reduced by the innovation response to a unilateral cut in emissions.
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disaggregated regions). While this literature generally ignores endogenous
innovation, this paper shows that in the presence of externalities in knowl-
edge creation, green R&D subsidies are a crucial part of the optimal climate
policy (a point also made by AABH). In addition, it also derives the opti-
mal unilateral policy in the presence of trade in goods, which neither this
literature nor the CGE trade literature mentioned above do.5
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies the equilibrium, identies
which policies are able to ensure sustainable growth and discusses the models
main assumptions. Section 4 solves for the second-best policy when the
South is constrained to be in laissez-faire, both analytically and numerically.
Section 5 discusses how the main results generalize when there are knowledge
spillovers. An online Appendix contains the proofs and further extensions.
2. Model
I consider a discrete-time, innite-horizon two-country (North, N , and
South, S), two-sector (polluting P and non-polluting NP ), three-factor (cap-
ital, labor and scientists) HeckscherOhlinRicardo model in which sector P
is similar to the economy of AABH. Each country is endowed with a xed
amount of labor and capital, LN ; KN and LS; KS, and a mass 1 of scientists.
The North is meant to represent countries which are ambitious in tackling
climate change and the South countries which are not. I consider an ad-
mittedly extreme scenario in which the North is able to implement strong
environmental policies and the South does not carry any policy at all of
course, in reality, most countries lay somewhere between these two extremes.
As already mentioned, the division North-South need not fall along the lines
of developed versus developing countries, in particular because the United
States have not signed the Kyoto protocol. Yet, in the numerical exercise, I
follow the CGE literature and identify the North with the countries which
were subject to binding constraints under the Kyoto protocol, including the
United States, and the South with the rest of the world.
2.1. Welfare
The economy admits, for each period t, a representative agent in the
North who lives for one period and a like representative agent in the South.
5Hassler and Krusell (2012) are close to doing so but their model does not feature trade
in goods (nor innovation), and they do not explore the full set of policy instrumments.
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The utility of time-t agent in country X 2 fN;Sg is given by  (St)CXt ,
where St is the quality of the environment (identical in North and South)
and CXt is the nal good consumption in country X. The social welfare
function aggregates these preferences according to:
U =
1X
t=0
1
(1 + )t
 
v (St)
 
CNt + C
S
t
1 
1   ; (1)
where  > 0 is the discount rate and   0 is the inverse elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution ( = 1 corresponds to a logarithmic utility). Therefore,
the social planner cares only about the time prole of world consumption and
environmental quality. Section 4.2 discusses an alternative set-up where she
also cares about the distribution of consumption between North and South.
Consumption, CXt , and environmental quality, St, are weakly positive and
v is increasing in St. There is an upper-bound on St, denoted S, that corre-
sponds to a pristine environment. I dene an environmental disaster as an
instance of environmental quality reaching zero in nite time. I assume that
v (0) = 0 so that a disaster is as detrimental to welfare as zero consumption.6
2.2. Production
Final consumption is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of the consumption of
two goods, polluting, P , and nonpolluting, NP :
CX =
 
CXP
  
CXNP
(1 )
; (2)
where CXY represents the quantity of good Y 2 fP;NPg consumed in country
X 2 fN;Sg.7 The analysis extends easily to the case where the consumption
aggregate between the two goods is CES with an elasticity of substitution
smaller than 1.8 Goods P and NP are the only goods that are traded in-
ternationally. Good P represents tradable goods the production of which
6The notion of sustainability is dened in the literature on exhaustible resource. A
consumption path is sustainable if the consumption ow is bounded away from zero.
Here, environmental quality a¤ects utility directly, so a path can be dened as sustainable
if the utility ow is bounded away from the utility ow obtained with zero consumption.
Therefore the economy is on an unsustainable path if a disaster occurs.
7Whenever this does not lead to confusion, I drop the time subscript but it should be
clear that allocations, technologies and policies are time-dependent.
8A previous version of the paper (CEPR Discussion Paper 9733) does so. On the other
hand, the analysis would be di¤erent if the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1 (see
section 3.6).
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generates a lot of greenhouse gases emissions (in particular energy-intensive
goods), while goodNP represents the other tradable goods. When the model
is calibrated, good P is identied with the sectors which have the highest
CO2 emissions over value-added ratio, namely the manufacture of chemicals
and chemical products (ISIC code 24), other nonmetallic mineral products
(26), and basic metals (27), good NP is identied with the rest of manu-
facturing (see Table A.1 in Appendix A.15). Even though not all emissions
can be traced to the tradable sector, the paper initially focuses on tradable
goods, since it is because of international trade that policymakers fear that
unilateral policies may have adverse consequences. Emissions for the produc-
tion of tradable goods represent a signicant share of CO2 emissions once
electricity and heat are allocated to consuming sectors, manufacturing and
construction represented 36.9 % of world CO2 emissions in 2010 according to
the International Energy Agency.9 The inclusion of nontradables is discussed
in Section 5.
Good P is produced competitively with a clean input Y Xc and a dirty
input Y Xd according to
Y XP =
 
Y Xc
 " 1
" +
 
Y Xd
 " 1
"
 "
" 1
; (3)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the clean and the dirty
input. The clean input models nonpolluting inputs that could substitute for
polluting inputs, for instance, renewable energies to replace fossil fuel energy
or bioplastics to replace traditional petroleum products.
Goods c; d and NP in country X are produced competitively following
Y XNP =
Z 1
0
AXNPi
 
xXi

di
 
KXnp
  
LXnp
1 1 
and (4)
Y Xzt =
Z 1
0
AXzi
 
xXzi

di
 
KXz
  
LXz
1 1 
for z 2 fc; dg : (5)
KXnp and L
X
np are the capital and labor employed in the assembly of good NP
in country X; xXNPi is the quantity of intermediates i employed in sector NP ;
9Construction is nontradable, but agriculture and forestry, which are tradable activities,
are not included in this gure. Using input-output tables Davis and Caldeira (2010)
estimates that today, 23% of carbon emitted is attributable to the production of goods
that will be exported.
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and AXNPi is its productivity, which is specic to the country and the sector.
KXz , L
X
z , x
X
zi and A
X
zi are dened similarly for good z 2 fc; dg.  is the factor
share of intermediates. Intermediates cannot be traded internationally and
are produced monopolistically according to
xXNPi =  
 1  KXNPi  LXNPi1  and xXzi =   1  KXzi   LXzi1  for z 2 fc; dg :
(6)
KXnpi and L
X
npi are the capital and labor employed in the production of inter-
mediate i for good NP in country X (and KXzi and L
X
zi are dened similarly).
Since the same factor share is used in the production of intermediates and in
the nal assembly of the good,  2 (0; 1) is the overall factor share of capital
in sector NP , and  2 (0; 1) is the overall factor share of capital in sector
z 2 fc; dg.10 Therefore the production of goods c and d and the production
of good NP only di¤er in the capital share. I assume throughout that  > ,
which is true empirically: within tradables, polluting sectors tend to be more
capital intensive. All results hold when  <  and the analysis of this section
can be extended to a pure Ricardian model with  = .11
I use KXNP and K
X
P to denote total employment of capital in sectors NP
and P in country X, so that:
KXNP  KXnp+
Z 1
0
KXNPidi and K
X
P  KXc +KXd +
Z 1
0
KXci di+
Z 1
0
KXdidi: (7)
Similarly, LXNP and L
X
P denote the total employment of labor in sectors NP
and P in country X. Factor market clearing and good market clearing imply:
KXP +K
X
NP  KX and LXP + LXNP  LX ; (8)
CNP + C
S
P  Y NP + Y SP and CNNP + CSNP  Y NNP + Y SNP : (9)
10The Cobb-Douglas structure of production for intermediates is important because it
ensures that monopolists get a constant share of the sectors revenues, which matters
for the incentives to innovate. Yet, the analysis can be extended straightforwardly to
production functions for which aggregation between capital and labor is not Cobb-Douglas.
11A Ricardian model would pose some technical di¢ culties for section 4 as explained
below. With di¤erent factor shares in the two sectors, the analysis is not signicantly
more complex, the model can account for situations where both countries do not fully
specialize and it will later be easy to introduce knowledge spillovers, as another reason for
trade than technological di¤erences is then needed. There is nothing special about capital
and labor being the two factors here instead of high-skill and low-skill labor for instance.
This is why the paper abstracts from capital accumulation.
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Intermediates producers face an iso-elastic demand with a price elasticity
of 1= (1  ) and therefore charge a mark-up 1= over marginal cost. This
leads to a classic monopoly distortion, as too few intermediates are produced.
A subsidy (1 ) to the purchase of intermediates ensures that the consumer
price is equal to marginal costs and therefore corrects for the monopoly dis-
tortion (see Appendix A.1). To simplify the exposition and focus the com-
parison between rst-best and second-best on environmental issues, I assume
throughout that this subsidy is implemented in both countries. Since the
share of intermediates is the same for all sectors, the monopoly distortion
only has a scale e¤ect, and this assumption is completely innocuous. Hence-
forth I abuse language by referring to the "laissez-faire" case as one where
governments only implement the subsidy to the use of all intermediates.
2.3. Innovation
At the beginning of every period, one-period monopoly rights are allo-
cated to entrepreneurs (such that each entrepreneur holds monopoly rights
on only a nite number of intermediates). Entrepreneurs can hire scientists
to increase the productivity of their variety. By hiring sXzit scientists, the
monopolist for intermediate i in (sub)sector z 2 fNP; c; dg can increase the
initial productivity AXzi(t 1) of her intermediate to
AXzit =

1 + 
 
sXzit
  
AXz(t 1)=A
X
zi(t 1)
 1
1 
1 
AXzi(t 1) for z 2 fc; d;NPg ;
(10)
where 0 <  < 1. AXzt is the average productivity of (sub)sector z 2 fc; d;NPg
at time t, and is dened as
AXzt 
Z 1
0
 
AXzit
 1
1  di
1 
for z 2 fc; d;NPg : (11)
The factor (AXzi(t 1))
 1=(1 ) captures decreasing returns to scale in innova-
tion (the more advanced is a technology, the more di¢ cult it is to innovate
further), and (AXz(t 1))
1=(1 ) denotes knowledge spillovers from the other in-
termediates in the same sector and country. The innovation technology ex-
hibits decreasing returns to scale in the mass of scientists hired (e.g., because
scientists hired for the same intermediate in the same period risk reproducing
the same innovation) and  measures the concavity of the innovation func-
tion.  measures the size of innovations ( is related to the length of a time
period, a shorter time period will be associated with a lower ).
11
Since the mass of scientists is equal to 1 in both countries, the market
clearing equation is given byZ 1
0
 
sXNPit + s
X
cit + s
X
dit

di  1: (12)
Because an entrepreneur has monopoly rights for one period only, she
will hire scientists so as to maximize current prots instead of the entire
ow of prots generated by the innovations of her scientists. The allocation
of scientists across (sub)sectors is therefore myopic. One-period monopoly
rights are the only ine¢ ciency in innovation and they allow one to model
as simply as possible the building on the shoulder of giants externality,
the existence of which has long been recognized by the endogenous growth
literature. In the specic context of climate change, this externality plays a
crucial role in explaining why clean technologies have so far failed to really
take o¤, and why direct research incentives in addition to carbon taxes are
welfare improving, a point made by AABH and Gerlagh et al. (2014).12
There are no knowledge spillovers between sectors. Cross-country spillovers
are absent for the moment but introduced in Section 5. A xed mass of sci-
entists in both countries implies that the amount of resources devoted to
productivity improvements (in particular R&D) remains the same in both
countries and over time. It allows us to focus on the direction of techni-
cal change and ensures that one country does not become arbitrarily large
relative to the other. This assumption is further discussed in section 3.6.
2.4. Environment
Within the bounds 0 and S, environmental quality evolves according to
St = (1 + )St 1  
 
NY Ndt + 
SY Sdt

. (13)
The parameter X > 0 measures the rate of environmental degradation from
the production of dirty inputs (which may di¤er across countries) and  > 0
is the regeneration rate of the environment. Without loss of generality, I
assume that S0 = S. Such a law of motion captures the idea that the
environments regeneration capacity decreases with greater environmental
12With permanent monopoly rights, innitely lived agents, and no environmental ex-
ternality, the e¢ cient innovation allocation would be an equilibrium, but usually not the
only one.
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degradation the type of negative feedback that climatologists worry about,
e.g., the change in Earths albedo and the release of captured greenhouse
gases which may occur as the polar ice cap melts. It is adopted for simplicitys
sake but, unless explicitly mentioned, the analytical results do not depend
on it. The only important assumption is that if emissions become too large,
St reaches the disaster level.13 The dirty input is directly responsible for
environmental degradation, which is equivalent to a situation where it can
can be combined with a (cheap) fossil fuel resource in a Leontie¤ way.14
2.5. Policy tools
Section 4 solves the social planners problem, but Section 3 studies only
whether or not an environmental disaster can be prevented with specic
policy instruments, the ones that will eventually be used to decentralize the
optimal policy. A policy is characterized by a sequence of ad valorem taxes
on the dirty input Xt in each country (the equivalent of a carbon tax),
a sequence of ad valorem subsidies for scientists in each country and each
subsector,15 and a sequence of ad valorem trade taxes bt on the polluting
good (by Lerner symmetry, they could equally be on the other good). All
subsidies and taxes are nanced or rebated through lump-sum taxation at
the country level.
The trade tax is implemented by the North, so that prices in the South
are equal to international prices: pSNPt = pNPt and p
S
Pt = pPt, while prices
in the North follow pNNPt = pNPt and p
N
Pt = pPt (1 + bt). A positive trade
tax corresponds to a tari¤ (resp., export subsidy) when the North imports
13Real climate dynamics are much more complicated. In particular, emissions have a
lagged impact on temperature, part of their impact is essentially innitely-lived and there
is a lot of uncertainty in the magnitude of the impact of CO2 on temperatures. This
matters for the numerical exercise but not the results of section 3.
14Therefore, we abstract from resource exhaustion. This is not a bad assumption since
oil does not play a major role in emissions for the manufacturing sector, while reserves of
coal, natural gas and non-traditional fossil fuels are in large supply relative to the time
scale of critical environmental degradation. Note that changes in the type of fossil fuel
used (from coal to natural gas) can signicantly a¤ect the emission rate, yet, modeling
such a possibility would not a¤ect the propositions of the paper.
15In order to ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation of scientists, I assume that
it is possible to subsidize only a given mass of scientists; hence the social planner can use
the subsidy to determine the exact allocation. If the subsidy is greater than 100 percent,
then a monopolist may be willing to hire scientists even if she is not producing any good.
13
(resp., exports) good P .16 When the North is the only country intervening,
I assume that trade balance must be maintained every period (there is no
intertemporal trade):
pPt
 
Y SPt   CSPt

+ pNPt
 
Y SNPt   CSNPt

= 0: (14)
The trade tax is not explicitly related to the carbon content of imports. If
the South does not undertake any policy, then relating the tax to the average
carbon content of imports from a given country and in a given sector would
not alter the results; since each Southern rm is atomistic, its impact on
average emission is innitesimal and so its behavior will not a¤ect the trade
tax it pays. Changing the behavior of Southern rms would require either
the North to know the exact carbon content of each specic import, which
seems implausible, or the South to implement its own policy.
3. A positive analysis of unilateral environmental policies
This section presents a positive analysis of unilateral environmental poli-
cies. The rst two subsections solve for the allocation of innovation, in par-
ticular subsection 3.2 shows how directed technical change reinforces the
pollution haven e¤ect. The following three subsections focus on whether an
environmental disaster can be prevented. Section 3.3 shows that the economy
reaches a disaster in laissez-faire and how such disaster may be prevented if
there is only one country. Section 3.4 explains why taxing the Norths pol-
luting sector likely fails to prevent a disaster. Section 3.5 describes how a
disaster can be avoided using unilateral policies in the North. Finally, Section
3.6 discusses some of the assumptions. For a given policy, the equilibrium is
dened as follows.
Denition 1. A feasible allocation is a sequence of demands for capital
(KXnpt; K
X
NPit; K
X
ct ; K
X
cit; K
X
dt ; K
X
dit), demands for labor (L
X
npt; L
X
NPit; L
X
ct ; L
X
cit;
LXdt; L
X
dit), demands for intermediates (x
X
zit for z 2 fc; d;NPg), demands for
inputs
 
Y Xct ; Y
X
dt

, goods production
 
Y XPt ; Y
X
NPt

; demands for goods
 
CXPt; C
X
NPt

,
research allocations
 
sXzit for z 2 fc; d;NPg

, and quality of the environment
16Starting from a situation where the North imports good P under free trade, an increas-
ingly higher trade tax corresponds to a positive tari¤ up to the point where it implements
autarky. Beyond that point, the North begins to export good P and the trade tax is a
positive export subsidy.
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St such that, in each period t and in each country X 2 fN;Sg ; factor and
good markets clear (i.e., (8), (9), and (12) hold).
Denition 2. For a given policy, an equilibrium is given by a feasible alloca-
tion and sequences of wages of workers (wXt ), returns to capital (r
X
t ), wages of
scientists (Xt ), consumer prices for intermediates
 
'Xzit for z 2 fc; d;NPg

,
producer prices for clean and dirty inputs (pXct ; p
X
dt), and international prices
of goods (pPt; pNPt) for X 2 fN;Sg such that: (i)
 
'Xzit; x
X
zit; s
X
zit; K
X
zit; L
X
zit

maximizes prots by the producer of intermediate i in sector z 2 fc; d;NPg
in country X; (ii) LXzt; and K
X
zt maximize the prots of the producer of good
z 2 fc; d;NPg; (iii) Y Xct and Y Xdt maximize the prots of producer of good
P ; (iv) CXPt and C
X
NPt maximize consumersutility under the trade balance
constraint (14).
3.1. Trade and innovation allocation
Trade pattern. Here I analyze the equilibrium when the only policy
implemented is a carbon tax in the North Nt  0; the results are derived
and generalized in Appendix A.1. In each country, aggregate production in
each sector can be written as
Y XPt =
AXPt
1  Xt
 
KXPt
  
LXPt
1 
and Y XNPt = A
X
NPt
 
KXNPt
  
LXNPt
1 
;
(15)
where    (1  )1    , AXPt 
 
AXct
" 1
+
 
1 + Xt
1 "  
AXdt
" 1 1" 1
and Xt  Xt
 
AXdt=A
X
Pt
" 1  
1 + Xt
 " 2 [0; 1) (as St = 0, St = 0). AXPt=  1  Xt 
decreases in Xt and measures the e¤ective average productivity of sector P
in country X. This formulation highlights that, in a given period, the model
collapses to a HeckscherOhlin model with varying productivity across coun-
tries. In laissez-faire (that is for Nt = 0), the South has the comparative
advantage in the polluting good P if and only if
ASPt
ASNPt
 1
  KS
LS
>

ANPt
ANNPt
 1
  KN
LN
: (16)
Trade results fromRicardian forces (relative productivity) as well as Heckscher
Ohlin forces (relative factors endowment). Provided the di¤erence in com-
parative advantage is not too large, both countries produce both goods.
When the di¤erence in comparative advantage is larger, one and eventually
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both countries fully specialize. Besides, a positive carbon tax in the North 
Nt > 0

reduces the productivity of sector P there and therefore increases
the chance that the South has a comparative advantage in that sector.
Emissions. Emissions are given by EXt = 
X
 
1 + Xt
 "  
AXdt=A
X
Pt
"
Y XPt .
Thus the emission rate in sector P is increasing in the ratio of dirty to clean
productivities AXdt=A
X
ct and decreasing in the carbon tax 
X
t .
Allocation of innovation. Entrepreneurs face a two-stage problem. In
the second stage, they choose prices to maximize their prots given their
productivity. Post-innovation prots in sector z 2 fc; d;NPg are given by:
Xzit = (1  )
 
AXzit=A
X
zt
 1
1  pXztY
X
zt : (17)
These prots are proportional to the revenues of the intermediates (sub)sector
(because of the Cobb-Douglas specication) and are increasing in the pro-
ductivity of the intermediate, AXzit. In the rst stage, entrepreneurs hire
scientists to increase the productivity of their intermediate. Thanks to the
knowledge spillovers across varieties, all monopolists in a given (sub)sector
hire the same number of scientists and average productivity grows following
AXzt =
 
1 + 
 
sXzt
1 
AXz(t 1) for z 2 fc; d;NPg :
Therefore, regardless of the technology and its level of development, the same
amount of innovation resources (scientists) is required for a given propor-
tional increase in productivity. Such formulation is common in endogenous
growth models as it is consistent with steady-state growth.
Path dependence in clean versus dirty technologies. Assume that
country X produces good P (otherwise, sXct = s
X
dt = 0). Combining the rst-
order conditions with respect to the number of scientists in the clean and
dirty subsector yields the following equation: 
sXct
1   
1 + 
 
sXct

(sXdt)
1   
1 +  (sXdt)
 = pXctY XctpXdtY Xdt =  1 + Xt "

AXct
AXdt
" 1
: (18)
The second equality follows from the demand equation for both inputs in
sector P (knowing that the production technologies di¤er only by their pro-
ductivity level). The ratio of revenues in the clean sector to those in the dirty
sector increases with the ratio of clean to dirty technologies. This association
reects two counteracting forces: a larger technology ratio leads to a larger
market share ratio but also to a lower price ratio; the former e¤ect dominates
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when the inputs are substitutes (" > 1). Thus, in laissez-faire (Xt = 0), for
a su¢ ciently small innovation size , more scientists are allocated to the
dirty than to the clean subsector if and only if the dirty sector is already the
most advanced AXd(t 1) > A
X
c(t 1): there is path dependence (see Appendix
A.2).17,18 A carbon tax in the North reduces demand for the dirty input.
Therefore, for a given mass of scientists in sector P , it leads to a reallocation
of innovation within that sector towards clean technologies, which is stronger
the larger the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs, ", is.
Amplication of comparative advantage. Assume that production
occurs in both sectors (otherwise, innovation occurs only in the active sec-
tor). By combining the rst-order conditions with respect to the number of
scientists in (sub)sectors NP , c and d, I obtain 
sXct
1   
1 + 
 
sXct

+
 
sXdt
1   
1 + 
 
sXdt

(sXNPt)
1   
1 +  (sXNPt)
 =
 
1  Xt

pXPtY
X
Pt
pXNPtY
X
NPt
: (19)
 
1  Xt

pXPtY
X
Pt are the net of tax revenues of the polluting sector. There-
fore, for a given ratio AXd(t 1)=A
X
c(t 1) of initial productivities within sector P
and given carbon tax Xt , the number of scientists allocated to sector P is
increasing in the ratio of sector P to sector NP revenues. Under free trade,
prices are equalized in both countries, and each tends to innovate relatively
more in its exporting sector (it necessarily does so when ANct=A
N
dt = A
S
ct=A
S
dt
and Nt = 0). In laissez-faire, comparative advantages are typically amplied
over time, so that one and eventually both countries fully specialize.
By contrast, in autarky, consumer demand implies that
pXNPtY
X
NPt=
 
pXPtY
X
Pt

= (1  ) =; (20)
17If  is large, however, and AXd(t 1) and A
X
c(t 1) are close to each other, multiple equilibra
may exist (as in AABH): if more scientists are allocated to clean than to dirty technologies
at time t, clean technologies may become more developed than dirty ones at time t (even
though they were not at time t 1), which in return would justify that more scientists got
allocated to clean than to dirty technologies.
18One might think however that innovation could be easier for new technologies (such
as clean technologies) where low-hanging fruits are more common. For instance we could
have AXct =

1 + max

1;

A
AXct
  
sXct
1 
AXc(t 1) for some A > 0 and  > 0. Such
formulation would go against path dependence in clean versus dirty technologies but only
temporarily (as long as AXct < A). Yet, Aghion et al. (forthcoming) nd evidence of path
dependence in the car industry.
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so that innovation always occurs in both sectors in that case.
Equilibrium uniqueness. As innovating more in a sector increases
a countrys comparative advantage in that sector, which, in turn, prompts
more innovation in the same sector, multiple equilibria could arise when
the innovation size  is large enough. On the other hand, with a small ,
the concavity of the innovation technology ensures that the equilibrium is
unique. Although the main results of this section could be extended to a
case with multiple equilibria, focusing on a unique equilibrium simplies the
exposition. Henceforth, I assume that the conditions of the following lemma
are satised (proof in Appendix A.2).19
Lemma 1. If  is small enough and   1=2, the equilibrium is unique.
3.2. The dynamic pollution haven e¤ect
The following proposition characterizes the existence of a dynamic pollu-
tion haven e¤ect under free trade (proof in Appendix A.3).
Proposition 1. For  small enough, the introduction at time t of a positive
carbon tax Nt > 0 in the North increases innovation in the polluting sector in
the South, sSPt. If A
N
d(t 1)  ANc(t 1) and
 
1 + Nt
  ANd(t 1)=ANc(t 1)2, then
innovation in the polluting sector in the North, sNPt, decreases. An increase
in sSPt and a decrease in s
N
Pt further increases emissions in the South (relative
to a situation where innovation does not respond), provided that the Southern
dirty technologies are more advanced than clean ones (ASd(t 1)  ASc(t 1)) and
ANPt=
 
1  Nt

increases in sNPt (which is the case if

ANc(t 1)=A
N
d(t 1)
" 1
>
( ("  1)  1)  1 + Nt  " or ANd(t 1)=ANc(t 1) >  1 + Nt  "" 1 ).
The introduction of a positive carbon tax Nt in the North increases the
production cost of the polluting good P there and therefore reduces its pro-
duction. This raises its world price which leads to an increase in its produc-
tion in the South, and therefore an increase in Southern emissions (this is
19The technical assumption   1=2 is further necessary to ensure that the equilibrium
is unique when one country is close to a corner of specialization (i.e., to a point at which
a producer of the imported good would break even only if he produces an innitesimal
amount of the good). The lemma does not extend to the Ricardian case where  = :
in that case, no matter how small  is, there are multiple equilibria when the initial
comparative advantage is small.
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the classic static pollution haven e¤ect). Following (19), and for a su¢ ciently
small innovation size (such that the equilibrium is unique), an increase in the
relative revenues of sector P in the South leads to an increase in innovation in
that sector in the South (sSPt increases), while a decrease in the relative rev-
enues of sector P in the North leads to a decrease in innovation in that sector
in the North (sNPt decreases). This changes technology levels in a way which
further favors production of good P by the South and so further increases
Southern emissions (creating a dynamic pollution haven e¤ect).
For this logic to go unabated, a few additional assumptions are necessary.
First, the further the ratio of clean to dirty revenues, the more innovation in
sector P is attractive. If the carbon tax in the North is very large, the ratio
of clean to dirty revenues may be further from unity post-tax than it was
pre-tax, which might lead to an increase in sNPt (this is what the assumption
ANd(t 1)  ANc(t 1) and 1 + Nt 

ANd(t 1)=A
N
c(t 1)
2
prevents). Second, more
innovation in sector P in the South will increase the emission rate only if
ASd(t 1) > A
S
c(t 1) (otherwise it decreases it). Third, because of the distortion
created by the carbon tax, for some very specic combination of parameters, a
decrease in sNPt might increase A
N
Pt=
 
1  Nt

and thereby Y NPt , which would
push towards a decrease of Southern emissions (this case is ruled out for
instance if  is small).
Whether world emissions are more likely to increase when innovation re-
sponds to the policy change depends on the pattern of comparative advantage
and the emission rates. The dynamic pollution haven e¤ect increases South-
ern emissions but it also further decreases Northern emissions. Moreover,
the dynamic pollution haven e¤ect has permanent consequences: in all sub-
sequent periods, the relative productivity of the South in sector P will have
increased, which favors innovation in that sector itself and therefore tends to
increase Southern emissions. Proposition 2 below further characterizes the
dynamic consequences of a Northern carbon tax.
A carbon tax has an ambiguous e¤ect on clean innovation in the North:
as the market for good P shrinks, overall sector P innovation is reduced, but
within that sector, it gets reallocated towards clean technologies.
3.3. Environmental disaster in laissez-faire, with a global social planner or
in autarky
Under laissez-faire, as long as dirty technologies are more advanced than
clean ones in both countries, innovation in sector P remains directed primar-
19
ily toward dirty technologies. Since innovation in sector P does not asymp-
totically vanish (the exporting country innovates more in that sector than it
would under autarky), the production of good P grows unboundedly and so
do emissions. At some point, the regenerative capacity of the environment
becomes overwhelmed and the economy reaches an environmental disaster.
In contrast, if there were only one country (and therefore no trade), the
logic of AABH applies. The social planner could use clean research subsi-
dies, taxes on dirty research or carbon taxes to redirect innovation from the
dirty toward the clean subsector. Once clean technologies acquire a su¢ cient
lead over dirty intermediates, market forces will ensure that most research is
directed toward the clean subsector, which is now the most advanced. Even-
tually, the emission rate of good P approaches zero su¢ ciently fast to o¤set
growth good Ps production and a disaster can be avoided for su¢ ciently
high initial environmental quality. A social planner who can intervene in
both countries can use the same instruments and avert a disaster (for high
enough S0) by redirecting sector P innovation towards clean technologies in
countries which produce good P (proof in Appendix A.4).
Consider now the case of a social planner who can only intervene in
the North, but assume that both countries are in autarky. Then, without
knowledge spillovers, no policy restricted to the North can prevent a disaster
because Southern emissions grow unboundedly regardless of what the North
does. Therefore, absent international cooperation, trade is necessary to avoid
an environmental disaster.
3.4. Taxes on the polluting good in the North only
I now consider the case where trade is possible and only the North can
implement some policy (in particular, this implies that the North cannot pay
the South to implement a policy). The key to avoid an environmental disaster
in this context is to ensure that the South asymptotically fully specializes
in the nonpolluting sector NP . Otherwise, there is always innovation in
the polluting sector P in the South, and the production of good P and
therefore emissions grow unboundedly (see Appendix A.5 for a formal proof).
I rst focus on the case where the North can implement a positive carbon
tax and/or a positive tax on dirty research. Both instruments can reduce
emissions in the North, and prompt clean innovation there. However, such
policies may be incompatible with a South specializing in sector NP and
thus may fail to prevent an environmental disaster. More formally, one can
show (proof in Appendix A.6).
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Proposition 2. If innovation size  is small enough then, no matter how
high initial environmental quality S0 is, no combination of a positive carbon
tax and a positive tax on dirty research can prevent an environmental disaster
if: (i) clean technologies are less developed than dirty ones in both countries
(ANc0=A
N
d0  1 and ASc0=ASd0  1), (ii) the South has a weak initial compar-
ative advantage in the polluting sector P (i.e.,
 
ASP0=A
S
NP0
 1
  KS=LS  
ANP0=A
N
NP0
 1
  KN=LN), and (iii) either clean technologies are su¢ ciently
less developed than dirty ones in the South (ASc0=A
S
d0 is su¢ ciently small) or
the South has a su¢ ciently strong initial comparative advantage in P .
Under laissez-faire and with the assumptions of the proposition, the South
innovates more than the North in the polluting sector P , which reinforces
its comparative advantage over time eventually leading it to specialize in
that sector (the amplication of comparative advantage e¤ect described
above). The North government cannot reverse this pattern simply by using
a positive tax on dirty research or a positive carbon tax. In contrast, a
carbon tax reduces the productivity of sector P in the North, which leads to
an increase in sector P innovation in the South and a decrease in the North
(as specied in Proposition 1). This further strengthens the comparative
advantage of the South in sector P . A positive tax on dirty innovation
in the North has similar e¤ects to a carbon tax: it drives scientists away
from sector P toward the nonpolluting sector NP ; and, within sector P ,
it allocates innovation toward the initially backward clean subsector, which
further reduces the growth rate of average productivity ANPt the resulting
increase in the price of good P also leads to more innovation in sector P
in the South. Accordingly, positive Northern taxes on good P can only
accelerate the Southern specialization in that sector. In fact, the economy
typically grows faster since more specialization entails less overlap in the
type of innovations being undertaken by both countries, and, as a result,
such policies are then likely to accelerate environmental degradation.20
20The extreme version of this argument is illustrated by the knife-edge case where
ANc0=A
N
d0 = A
S
c0=A
S
d0 < 1 and
 
ASP0=A
S
NP0
 1
  KS=LS =
 
ANP0=A
N
NP0
 1
  KN=LN , with
no carbon tax, there would be no trade in equilibrium, and emissions and the economy
would grow at rate (1 + 2 )1    1. A small carbon tax Nt is enough to ensure that
both countries eventually specialize so that emissions (and the economy) asymptotically
grow at rate (1 + )1    1.
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Condition (iii) in Proposition 2 is necessary because when the ratio of
clean to dirty revenues is farther from unity in the North than in the South,
more innovation in sector P might take place in the North even if the South
exports good P .21 The assumption that  is small could also be relaxed
if ASc0=A
S
d0 is su¢ ciently small and the South has a su¢ ciently strong initial
comparative advantage in P : in this case, all possible equilibria would feature
the South specializing in sector P leading to an environmental disaster.
The crucial hypothesis of Proposition 2 is that the South has a compar-
ative advantage in sector P . When the North is identied with Annex I
countries, this hypothesis seems to hold since the CGE literature systemat-
ically nds that developed countries are net carbon importers as mentioned
in the introduction (and I also nd that the South has a comparative advan-
tage in sector P initially in the numerical exercise in section 4.3). Yet, with a
di¤erent denition of the North, this hypothesis may not hold, in which case,
the North might be able to prevent an environmental disaster with a carbon
tax only as the pollution haven and the amplication of initial comparative
advantage e¤ects work in opposite directions.
3.5. Introducing clean research subsidies and the trade tax
Allowing the North to use clean research subsidies and a trade tax leads
to the following result.
Proposition 3. A combination of a temporary trade tax and a temporary
clean research subsidy in the North can prevent an environmental disaster
provided that the initial environmental quality S is su¢ ciently high.
The key di¤erence between clean research subsidies and the carbon tax
or the tax on dirty research is that the former can also reallocate scientists
21That is this condition plays a similar role to the assumption that ANd(t 1)  ANc(t 1)
and
 
1 + Nt
  ANd(t 1)=ANc(t 1)2 in Proposition 1. More specically: the incentive to
innovate in sector P is, ceteris paribus, lower when the revenues in the clean and dirty sub-
sectors are close to each other that is when

AXc(t 1)
" 1
and
 
1 + Xt
 " 
AXd(t 1)
" 1
are comparable. Given carbon taxes that are high enough or taxes on dirty research that
are of su¢ cient duration, the ratio of clean to dirty revenues may become farther from
unity in the North than in the South. In that event, assumption (iii) ensures that this
e¤ect is dominated, either directly if the initial comparative advantage is large enough, or
because the di¤erence in comparative advantage would have had to become large before
this occurs when ASc0=A
S
d0 is su¢ ciently small.
22
who were working in the nonpolluting sector NP toward the clean subsec-
tor. This boosts innovation in clean technologies in the North, even when the
North does not have the comparative advantage in sector P . Increasing inno-
vation in clean technologies makes sector P less polluting and helps build a
comparative advantage in that sector. In the meantime, a positive trade tax
reduces production and therefore innovation in sector P in the South, which
also helps reverse the pattern of comparative advantage. For su¢ ciently high
initial environmental quality, a policy combining these two instruments can
prevent a disaster. To see this, consider the following two-phase approach
(this is not the optimal policy, which is derived in Section 4). First, a so-
cial planner implements a tari¤ large enough to shut down trade, so that
innovation in the South must be balanced between the two sectors P and
NP . Simultaneously, she implements large clean research subsidies so that
nearly all Northern scientists innovate in the clean subsector, and the North
innovates more in sector P than the South. Once the North has acquired
the comparative advantage in that sector and ANc(t 1)=A
N
d(t 1) is su¢ ciently
large, the social planner can discontinue all policies and re-open up to trade.
Market forces then ensure that the production of good P eventually moves
entirely to the North where it relies essentially on clean technologies,22 emis-
sions go down to zero in both countries, and a disaster can be avoided.23 The
absence of a nontradable polluting sector is crucial here: otherwise (and with-
out knowledge spillovers), even if the South were not to produce the tradable
polluting good, it would still produce the nontradable one, and therefore it
would still be impossible to prevent an environmental disaster.
From this discussion one might think that clean research subsidies alone
should be enough to prevent an environmental disaster. This is true if the ini-
tial comparative advantage of the South is not too large, but as the following
remark stipulates, it does not always hold (proof in Appendix A.7).
Remark 1. There exist initial factor endowments and technologies, such
that no matter how high S0 is, no combination of a carbon tax, a tax on
dirty research, and a subsidy for clean research can prevent a disaster.
22This follows lemma A.3, applied to the case where the North now has the comparative
advantage in sector P at some date  , with ANd=A
N
c < A
S
c=A
S
d < 1.
23This result does not rest on the assumption that  is small as the logic can be extended
to a scenario with multiple equilibria.
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Clean research subsidies alone cannot prevent a disaster when the South
fully specializes in sector P and clean technologies in the South are su¢ -
ciently less advanced than dirty ones. In that case, all Southern scientists
are allocated to sector P and, asymptotically, to dirty technologies. So even
if the North were to allocate all its scientists to clean technologies, ASPt would
grow as fast as ANPt. That situation is irreversible and an environmental dis-
aster cannot be avoided. Full specialization in the South occurs in the rst
place when its initial comparative advantage in sector P is su¢ ciently large
or when clean technologies are su¢ ciently backward in the North, as the
average productivity of sector P in the North, ANPt, grows slowly during the
period when clean technologies are catching up with dirty ones.24
3.6. Discussion
Here, I discuss some of the assumptions of the model. Appendix A.8
presents additional results regarding alternative instruments.
Size and mass of scientists. The relative size of the two countries
in terms of capital and labor endowments plays a role quantitatively: the
larger the North is, the easier it is to reverse comparative advantages. In
the long-run, the relative size of the two economies depends on the mass of
scientists, which is a proxy for the amount of resources spent on innovation.
The assumption that the two countries have the same xed mass of scientists
implies that the analysis is implicitly restricted to a case where the two
countries (or groups of countries) are of similar size.
If the mass of scientists in the North (sN) were much smaller than in the
South (sS), the North would eventually become a small economy relative to
the South, and the Souths economy will behave as if it were in autarky:
regardless of the policies undertaken by the North, a disaster would be un-
avoidable. In contrast, if sN was much larger than sS, a disaster could be
avoided using clean research subsidies without the need for a tari¤ (as ANPt
could grow faster than ASPt allowing the North to progressively build a com-
parative advantage in sector P even if the South has fully specialized in sector
P ). Depending on parameters, a disaster may also be avoided using taxes
on dirty research or a carbon tax under the assumptions of Proposition 2.25
24This is the only result of this section that would not hold if goods P and NP were
strict complements (instead of Cobb-Douglas): in this case the South could not stay fully
specialized in sector P if both countries innovate only in that sector.
25For instance, if the consumption share of good P () is close to 1 and sN is large
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This suggests that the inclusion of the United States in the North is crucial.
However, one may think that sS is bound to increase, making it harder and
harder for the North to intervene decisively as time passes.
The assumption that the mass of scientists is exogenous is not innocuous
either. With an endogenous mass of scientists, clean research subsidies be-
come an even more potent instrument, as they can ensure that the amount of
resources spent in R&D in the North becomes greater than that in the South
(so that a disaster becomes avoidable with clean research subsidies only).
The impact of a carbon tax depends on the specic way in which innovation
is endogenized, but in models where the cost of innovation moves with GDP,
a carbon tax is likely to reduce overall innovation since innovation depends
on rmsprots which are proportional to the revenues net of taxes (this
would reinforce Proposition 2).
Three sectors. The results of the paper crucially depend on the as-
sumption that innovation may occur in all three (sub)sectors (clean, dirty
and non-polluting). If innovation were limited to clean and dirty technolo-
gies within the polluting sector, then the North could not build a comparative
advantage in a specic sector. With clean innovation in the polluting sector
only (as in Di Maria and Smulders, 2004; Di Maria and van der Werf, 2008
and Acemoglu, Aghion and Hémous, 2014), the model would falsely assume
that all innovations in the polluting sector decrease emissions. In contrast,
with only dirty innovations in the polluting sector, no innovations could re-
place existing polluting technologies since the nal good is a Cobb-Douglas
aggregate of the polluting and the nonpolluting goods.26
The assumption that the clean and dirty inputs are substitute (" > 1)
is crucial, as otherwise avoiding a disaster with unilateral policies is not
possible.27 Yet, this is a very natural assumption, rst if "  1, both in-
enough, ANPt=A
N
NPt can grow faster than A
S
Pt=A
S
NPt, leading to a reversal of comparative
advantage; if  = 1=2, on the contrary, the previous analysis still holds.
26Here clean innovations allow to develop an input which substitutes for the dirty one,
and the polluting sectors productivity can grow at the same rate whether it relies mostly
on the clean or the dirty inputs. If the clean alternative had some growths costs, then
preventing a disaster with unilateral policies would be more di¢ cult (this would be the
case in a model where the clean alternative refers to energy e¢ ciency improvements, and
where energy is complement to other inputs in the polluting sector).
27Doing so requires positive growth in the polluting sector in the North to ensure that
Southern emissions do not grow unboundedly, but positive growth in the polluting sector
is not possible without positive growth in dirty input production.
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puts would be essential in the production of the polluting good and therefore
clean inputs would not really represent an alternative to dirty inputs; second,
Papageorgiou, Saam and Schulte (2013) show empirically that the elasticity
of substitution between clean and dirty inputs (notably in energy) is sig-
nicantly greater than 1. The assumption of a unit elasticity between the
polluting and non-polluting good is very common in the literature, and, as
already mentioned, the analysis extends to the case where goods P and NP
are complements.28 It does not extend to the case where P and NP are
substitutes (and therefore not essential). Then whether an environmental
disaster can be avoided or not depends crucially on how large ASd is relative
to ASNP : a large A
S
d may push the South towards producing the dirty input
rather than the non-polluting good, regardless of the policy in the North.
Importantly, dirty innovations generally include not only innovations in
the energy sector that make fossil fuel energy cheaper (for instance by al-
lowing the use of shale gas or bituminous sands), but also innovations in
components that are complements to fossil fuel energy and thus increase its
demand, or the introduction of new goods or inputs that rely on fossil fuel
energy. In practice, some innovations in the polluting sector may complement
both fossil fuel energy and alternative forms of energy; one could represent
such innovations as improving the productivity of an additional input in
the polluting sector complement to both the clean and dirty inputs. This
would not a¤ect the economic intuitions developed and my results could be
extended to this scenario.
The Souths behavior. The paper assumes that the South does not
implement any policy. Regarding environmental policy today, this seems a
reasonable assumption: several countries seem willing to move forward, while
others are opposing a global agreement while often undertaking very limited
domestic policies (Barrett, 1994, explains why designing a self-enforcing in-
ternational agreement on climate change is di¢ cult). A reason why these
28The CGE literature often assumes a unit elasticity of substitution between manufac-
turing goods, which often include a non-polluting sector and a more detailed representation
of polluting goods (see for instance Babiker and Rutherford, 2005 or Boehringer et al.,
2010). Copeland and Taylor (2005) assume that polluting and non-polluting goods are
both essential (which rules out the substitute case). This also seems very reasonable given
what the two sectors stand for: for instance the polluting good includes the manufac-
ture of basic metals (code 24) while the non-polluting good includes the manufacture of
machinery and equipment (code 28).
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divisions may persist in reality is the signicant delay between emissions and
damages that climate models predict, an aspect that I abstract from here: as
a result, it may be too late before skeptic countries get convinced that they
should start undertaking signicant policy actions. Even if one expects that
these divisions will eventually end, the results of the paper are still useful for
countries who are willing to intervene before the rest of the world.
Even if the South does not implement any environmental policy, it may
still want to implement trade policies, particularly if the Norths trade policy
hurts the South. Yet, Souths consumption is not necessarily negatively
a¤ected by the Norths unilateral policies, and the South benets from better
environmental quality. For instance, if the Norths temporary policy reverses
the pattern of comparative advantages, both countries fully specialize in the
long run. Income shares are linked to the consumption share of the good that
the country exports; therefore, if the income share for the polluting good is
smaller than for the nonpolluting one ( < 1  ), the Souths income share
will be larger under the North unilateral policy than under laissez-faire.29
Although a full analysis of the strategic interactions between two govern-
ments is beyond the scope of this paper, one can consider the case where
the South government is myopic and maximizes current consumption. This
government implements its own trade tax to improve its terms of trade. As
long as the South retains an initial comparative advantage in the polluting
good, this trade tax moves both countries closer to autarky and thus does
not prevent the North from reversing the pattern of comparative advantage.
Once the North exports the polluting good, the South implements its own
tari¤. This tari¤ slows down the Souths specialization in the nonpolluting
sector. Yet, once the North has acquired a su¢ ciently large comparative
advantage, it does not prevent the South from fully specializing in the non-
polluting sector. Therefore, a disaster can still be avoided for su¢ ciently
high initial environmental quality.
29Even in the short run, the South might benet: a tari¤ implemented by the North
hurts the South when the South exports the polluting good, but a trade tax high enough
to reverse the pattern of trade immediately may benet the South (this trade tax is then
an export subsidy).
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4. Optimal policy and numerical illustration
I now turn to the normative part of the paper, characterizing the rst-
best policy and the second-best policy under the constraint that the social
planner cannot intervene in the South. I then use a numerical example to
illustrate both policies and compute their welfare costs, and to show that
both trade and directed technical change act as double-edge swords.
4.1. First-Best: North and South Policy
Before solving for the optimal unilateral policy, the focus of this paper,
I briey present the rst-best which is a useful benchmark the solution is
derived in Appendix A.9. In the rst-best, the social planner maximizes (1)
subject to the following constraints: the production function equations (2),
(3), (4), (5), (6) and; the factor marketclearing equations (8) and (12); the
goods marketclearing equation (9); the environmental degradation equation
(13); and the knowledge accumulation equation (10).
The rst-best policy can be decentralized in the following way. As already
mentioned, a subsidy 1    to all intermediates corrects for the monopoly
distortion. The environmental externality is corrected by a carbon tax in
both countries that equalizes the marginal cost of the tax (lower current
consumption) with the marginal benet (higher environmental quality in all
subsequent periods). Carbon taxes in the North and the South di¤er in ad
valorem values across countries but are identical as a tax per unit of CO2.
The social planner corrects for the myopia of monopolists in their innovation
decisions by allocating scientists in accordance with the discounted value of
the entire stream of additional revenues generated by their innovation.
Since utility ow is minimized during a disaster and since the social plan-
ner can always reduce world emissions, the optimal policy always avoids a
disaster. In addition (as shown in Appendix A.10), if the discount rate 
is su¢ ciently small and the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution
  1, then both countries specialize in nite time and innovation in sector
P switches to mostly clean,30 so that emissions eventually vanish. With the
law of motion (13), the quality of the environment reverts to S and the
carbon tax reaches zero in nite time.31
30These are only su¢ cient conditions, and the optimal policy is likely to feature a switch
to clean innovations also when  > 1.
31For an alternative law of motion where environmental regeneration decreases as the
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4.2. Second-Best: Policy only in the North
I now turn to the case where the social planner cannot implement any
policy in the South, whose economy is in laissez-faire, and cannot transfer
income from one country to another. Trade balance must be maintained at
every point in time. The second-best policy is dened by the social planner
maximizing (1) subject to the following constraints: (2) for the North and
the South; constraints (3), (4), (5), (6), (8), (12) and (10) for the North only;
the environmental degradation constraint (13); the goods marketclearing
constraints in both countries, which are now written as
CNY t = Y
N
Y t +MY t and C
S
Y t = Y
S
Y t  MY t, for Y 2 fP;NPg ; (21)
where MY t denotes net imports of the North of good Y ; the trade balance
constraint
ptMPt +MNPt = 0; (22)
where pt  pPt=pNPt is the international price ratio; and constraints describ-
ing the Souths laissez-faire economy. These latter constraints (detailed in
Appendix A.11) are: a consumer demand equation
@CS
@CSP

@CS
@CSNP
 1
=

1  
CSNPt
CSPt
= pt; (23)
o¤ers equations in the South of the type
Y SPt = y
S
P
 
pt; A
S
Pt; A
S
NPt

and Y SNPt = y
S
NP
 
pt; A
S
Pt; A
S
NPt

; (24)
an emissions equation Y Sdt =
 
ASdt=A
S
Pt
"
Y SPt; an equation that species the
mass of scientists allocated to sector P ,
sSPt = s
S
P
 
pt; A
S
dt; A
S
ct; A
S
NPt

; (25)
and the resulting law of motion of aggregate productivity in the South:
ASNPt =
 
1 + 
 
1  sSPt
1 
ASNP (t 1), (26)
ASzt =
 
1 + 
 
sSzt
 
sSPt; a
S
t 1
1 
ASz(t 1), for z 2 fc; dg .
quality of the environment St approaches S, or where a share of emissions stay permanently
in the atmosphere, St may not reach S asymptotically. The optimal carbon tax may then
not converge to 0 but it becomes irrelevant in the sense that a 0 carbon tax would only
have a negligible e¤ect on welfare.
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The allocation between clean and dirty innovation sSct; s
S
dt is uniquely deter-
mined by the total mass sSPt and the ratio a
S
t 1 

ASc(t 1)=A
S
d(t 1)
" 1
. For
the problem to be well-dened, the Souths equilibrium must be unique given
the Norths allocation. An argument similar to that of Appendix A.2 shows
that it is the case when  is su¢ ciently small and   1=2. (This is where
the Ricardian case would pose a technical di¢ culty, with  = , even for a
small , the Souths equilibrium may not be uniquely dened.) This leads
to the following result (proof in Appendix A.11).
Proposition 4. The second-best policy can be decentralized through a carbon
tax in the North, research subsidies/taxes in the North, a subsidy for the use
of all intermediates, and a trade tax.
Therefore, the social planner uses the same instruments as before to ad-
dress the ine¢ ciencies in the Norths economy: the environmental externality,
the knowledge externality and the monopoly distortion. The trade tax, bt,
allows the social planner to distort prices in the South thereby a¤ecting the
allocation of factors there. The optimal allocation satises:
 (1  )1  p t
 
(1 + bt)
  btpt
@ySP
@pt
+
 
(1 + bt)
1    1 Y SNPt
pt
+
 
1  (1 + bt) 

(1  )Y SPt
!
= b!tS ASdt
ASPt
"
@ySP
@pt
  bt@sSPt@pt (27)
where b!t is the shadow value of a unit of environmental quality at time t
(in units of consumption at time t) and bt is the shadow value of moving
an additional scientist in the South from the nonpolluting sector NP to the
polluting sector P . In this expression, the left-hand side has the sign of bt,
which shows that the social planner imposes a wedge between relative prices
in the North and in the South. This wedge is generated by an environmental
motive (the rst term on the right-hand side) and an innovation motive
(the second term). The rst term is always positive. A positive trade tax
on good P imposed by the North reduces its relative price in the South,
which decreases its production there and emissions. The second term is
generally also positive as there is typically too much innovation in sector P
in the South (bt < 0) for two reasons. First, more innovation in sector P in
the South leads to more emissions. Second, to avoid a disaster which the
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social planner generally does the South must at least asymptotically fully
specializes in sector NP , so that current innovations in sector P will be of
little use in the future. Because of their myopia, Southern innovators do not
internalize this and their innovation e¤orts are tilted too much toward sector
P . By reducing the production of good P in the South, a positive trade
tax moves Southern scientists away from sector P . Therefore, the trade tax
is generally positive; it takes the form of a tari¤ when the North imports
good P and of an export subsidy otherwise. The next proposition further
characterizes the optimal policy (proof in Appendix A.13).
Proposition 5. (i) For a su¢ ciently high initial environmental quality S0,
the social planner avoids a disaster if the inverse elasticity of intertemporal
substitution   1; or if  < 1 and the discount rate  is su¢ ciently low.
The South must asymptotically be fully specialized in the nonpolluting sector
if initially clean technologies are less developed than dirty ones there (ASc0 
ASd0).
(ii) If ASc0  ASd0, S0 is su¢ ciently high,  is su¢ ciently small, and   1,
then the mass of scientists allocated to clean technologies in the North is
asymptotically 1, both countries fully specialize and the optimal trade tax
reaches 0 in nite time.
Since the North cannot fully control the Southern economy, avoiding a
disaster may not be feasible when S0 is low. Yet, when it is feasible, a
social planner will do so if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution   1
(as then a disaster brings a utility of  1), or if  < 1 and the discount
rate is su¢ ciently low (as then the social planner maximizes long-run utility
growth and S = 0 is an absorbing state). To avoid a disaster, the South must
asymptotically fully specialize in sector NP , and production of good P in the
North must be limited or a switch to clean innovations must occur. Statement
(ii) species su¢ cient conditions under which innovation does indeed switch
to mostly clean innovation in the North. The optimal policy maximizes
long-run growth when   1 and the discount rate is low enough. Long-run
growth, in return, is maximized if the North asymptotically innovates only
in clean technologies and the South in sector NP , in this case both countries
fully specialize in nite time and the trade tax reaches 0 (since environmental
quality can fully recover, the optimal carbon tax also reaches 0 but this result
may not extend to di¤erent law of motions for environmental quality).
In the problem considered so far, the social planner cares equally about
consumption in the North and the South. This allows to separate climate
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issues from redistribution issues. An alternative set-up is to consider that
the economy admits innitely lived representative agents in each country,
whose utilities are given by
P1
t=0
 
v (St)C
X
t
1 
=
 
(1  ) (1 + )t. The so-
cial planner maximizes a weighted sum of these utilities:
U =
1X
t=0
1
(1 + )t
v (St)
1 
1  

	
 
CNt
1 
+ (1 	)  CSt 1  ; (28)
where 	 2 [0; 1] is the weight on the Norths representative agent. Then, the
social planner also cares about the distribution of consumption. Appendix
A.14 discusses this approach and solves for this case. The rst-best is identi-
cal up to lump-sum transfers between the two countries. The second-best is
similar, but the trade tax must now also reects terms-of-trade issues and it
is modied so as to favor the country with the largest social marginal value of
consumption. If the social planner cares only about the North (	 = 1), then
this motive pushes toward a tari¤ when the North imports good P and an
export tax otherwise. If the social planner cares equally about both countries
(	 = 1=2) but the South is poorer, then it pushes toward an import or an
export subsidy. Proposition 5 still applies, except that full specialization may
only occur asymptotically and the trade tax may not asymptote 0 (because
of terms-of-trade motives).
4.3. Parameter Choices
Here, I briey describe the parametrization; details are given in Appen-
dix A.15. A period corresponds to 5 years, and initial values are based on
the 20032007 world economy while assuming laissez-faire in both countries.
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is unity ( = 1). The annual
time discount rate is 0:015, as in Nordhaus (2008). In line with the CGE
literature, the North comprises 33 countries in Annex I of the Kyoto protocol
(including the United States) and the South 18 major countries in the rest
of the world. Restricting attention to manufacturing, I compute the world
rate of emissions per dollar of value-added in each sector at the available
aggregation level, here using data on sectoral emissions of CO2 from fos-
sil fuel combustion given by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2010a),
and data on sectoral value added by the United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organization (UNIDO, 2011). The sectors with the highest rate are
identied with sector P namely the manufacture of chemicals and chemical
products, ISIC code 24, of other nonmetallic mineral products, 26, and of
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basic metals, 27 and the others with sector NP .32 As already mentioned,
Southern production is tilted toward sector P relative to Northern produc-
tion (Y NP0=Y
S
P0  Y SNP0=Y NNP0 = 0:77), so that the South has a small initial
comparative advantage in sector P .
The consumption share of good P is computed using world production
of both sectors:  = 0:257. The capital shares are  = 0:5 for sector P and
 = 0:3 for sector NP , here using the ratio of capital to labor compensations
in both sectors in the United States according to the EU KLEMS dataset,
[48], and the share of intermediates  = 1=3, a common value in endogenous
growth models. The elasticity of substitution between the clean and the dirty
input, " is xed at 5, but Appendix A.16 considers the cases of " = 3 and
10. The innovation size  is adjusted so that the long-run annual growth
rate is 2%, and the concavity of the innovation function is xed by choosing
 = 0:55 ( 0:5 so that the equilibrium is unique for a small ).
The quality of the environment St is linearly and negatively related to the
atmospheric concentration of CO2; the assumption that S0 = S is relaxed,
and the initial environmental quality S0 corresponds to the atmospheric con-
centration in 2003-2007 (379 ppm).  is chosen such that, for St = S0, half of
CO2 emissions are absorbed and do not add to atmospheric concentrations.
Changes in atmospheric CO2 concentrations are mapped against changes in
temperature, and S = 0 is chosen to correspond to a disaster temperature
level of 6C. The function  (St) is the same as in AABH and mimics the cost
function of Nordhaus (2008) for temperature increases up to 3C. I identify
the ratio Y Xc0 =Y
X
d0 with the ratio of nonfossil to fossil fuel energy produced
for country Xs primary energy supply (following IEA, 2010b). From this, I
derive the ratio AXc0=A
X
d0. This, together with the emission rates in sector P
in both countries, gives the emission rates per unit of dirty input X .33
Yet, the model is still very stylized and the numerical exercise should
not be taken too literally. A more complete calibration would feature a
more realistic carbon cycle, a more detailed trade model where domestic
production and imports are not perfect substitutes, a nontradable sector,
and some technologies in sector P common to the clean and the dirty inputs.
32According to the model, I ignore emissions from sector NP , which corresponds to
the other sectors in manufacturing (except 23, 25, 33, 36 and 37, for which data are not
available).
33Overall the emission rate in sector P in the South is nearly 4 times that of the Norths,
so that S > N , even though ANd0=A
N
c0 < A
S
d0=A
S
c0.
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Figure 1: First-best policy. From left to right, gures: 1.A and 1.B.
Such an exercise would deserve a separate paper and is left for future research.
4.4. Simulation results
Figure 1 describes the rst-best policy. Figure 1.A shows that sector-P
innovation switches to clean technologies (here immediately), and is rapidly
only carried out in the South, since both countries rapidly fully specialize (the
North clean, North dirty and South dirty lines are indistinguishable from the
x-axis and the scientists allocated to sector NP are not represented). This
rapid full specialization results from a relatively large growth rate (2% a
year), combined with a small di¤erence in capital shares between the two
sectors (   = 0:2) and a small initial comparative advantage. Either im-
perfect mobility of factors, cross-sector or cross-country knowledge spillovers,
or imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign goods would have
the e¤ect of slowing down the specialization process. Figure 1.B shows the
ad valorem carbon taxes in both countries, they decline and eventually reach
0 as the environment recovers; it declines faster in the South where clean
technologies catch up with dirty ones.
Figure 2 shows the second-best policy. Contrary to the rst-best case, the
North must now export good P in the long run. For these parameter values,
a large trade tax on good P (Figure 2.B) ensures that, right from the rst pe-
riod, the South specializes in sector NP , and thus does not innovate in sector
P (in Figure 2.A, the South clean and South dirty lines are indistinguishable
34
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Figure 2: Second-best policies. From left to right, gures 2.A and 2.B.
from the x-axis, all Southern innovation is in sector NP ). Several factors ex-
plain this feature: the high emission rate in the South means that it should
specialize rapidly in sector NP , its low initial comparative advantage that
the pattern of trade is easily reversed, and its smaller size together with a
small di¤erence   in factor shares between the two sectors imply that full
specialization there is reached quickly. The switch from predominantly dirty
to clean innovation in sector P occurs after 65 years. The switch is delayed
relative to the rst-best because the North starts with a lower emission rate
in sector P , so that the initial temperature increase is lower, and because
continuing to invest in dirty technologies helps the North build a large com-
parative advantage in sector P . The amount of clean innovation increases
over time and, beyond the time frame of the simulation, eventually reaches
one when the North fully specializes in sector P (in line with Proposition 5).
The unilateral policies which are able to avoid a disaster are quite radical
since they involve a reversal in the pattern of trade, so the welfare costs from
not being able to intervene in the South may be very large. Table 1 reports
the welfare costs of the rst-best and second best-policies, computed as the
equivalent percentage loss of world consumption every period relative to the
rst-best case in a miracle scenario under which the dirty input would
cease to pollute (i.e. N = S = 0). As already emphasized, the numbers
should not be taken literally considering the limits of the numerical exercise.
Yet, comparing the costs of the rst-best and second-best policies is still
of interest: in this simple model, not being able to intervene in the South
increases the welfare costs by a factor 4. The reason is that reversing the
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pattern of comparative advantages leads to signicant static costs in the rst
periods and to lower productivity levels in subsequent periods. Therefore
unilateral intervention is possible here but a global one is much preferred.34
Table 1: Disaster and welfare cost
First-best Second-best Third-best
Welfare cost (%) 6.36 24.64 24.75
Table 1 also presents the case of a thirdbest in which the North can
implement a positive carbon tax and research subsidies/taxes but cannot
implement trade, consumption, or production taxes. With the calibrated
parameter values it is still possible to avoid a disaster under such a policy
(which is not always the case, see Remark 1), and the welfare costs of dis-
pensing with the trade tax are small. With these parameters, the di¤erence
in initial comparative advantages is small and innovation is very e¤ective in
a¤ecting technological levels. As a result, the North can quickly acquire a
comparative advantage in sector P without the help of a trade tax by in-
novating more in that sector than in the second-best and implementing a
low carbon tax initially. As before, the South quickly specializes in sector
NP . Appendix A.16 discusses the distributional impacts and presents the
case where the social planner maximizes (28).
4.5. Trade and Directed Technical Change, Two Double-Edged Swords
Figure 3 shows the temperature increase for di¤erent policies when trade
is allowed for and when the two countries are in autarky, in laissez-faire and
under various policies. Laissez-faire leads to an environmental disaster after
50 years for the open economy case but occurs later in autarky, since economic
growth is lower in that case. Under free-trade and following Proposition 2, no
combination of a positive carbon tax or a tax on dirty research in the North
can prevent an environmental disaster. Figures 3.A depicts the combination
that minimizes CO2 emissions (Taxes on Good P in the North Only), the
curve is indistinguishable from the laissez-faire one, as it is not even possible
to delay a disaster with such a policy when trade is allowed.35 In contrast, in
34This increase in cost is almost entirely due to the environmental externality. In the
miracle case, the inability to intervene in the South generates welfare cost since innovation
there is not allocated optimally, but these costs are very small: 0.03%.
35The dynamic aspect is key in obtaining this result, since it also holds when North and
South initially have the same emission rates (when ASc0=A
S
d0 = A
N
c0=A
N
d0 and 
S = N ):
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Figure 3: Temperature increase in open economy and in autarky. From left to right:
Figures 2.A and 2.B.
autarky, such a policy can postpone the disaster for 85 years, as there is no
pollution haven e¤ect. The second-best curve in Figure 3.A shows how the
appropriate unilateral intervention avoids an environmental disaster, while
adding the same instrument (research subsidies) does not a¤ect emissions
much in autarky (in Figure 3.A, the second-best refers to the maximization
of (1), while in Figure 3.B, it is the combination of research subsidies and
positive carbon tax which minimizes CO2 emissions). Even in the rst-best
case temperature increases more in autarky because the growth rate of clean
technologies is lower than in the open economy scenario.36 Overall, Figure
2 illustrates the double-edged nature of trade: without it, unilateral policies
cannot prevent a disaster; but opening up to trade accelerates environmental
degradation if the North does not undertake the appropriate policy (this
relates this paper to the literature on the impact of trade on the environment,
e.g. Copeland and Taylor, 1995).
Directed technical change (DTC) plays a similar role. To study it, I
compare the current scenario with DTC to one in which the allocation of
innovation is exogenous and equal in all subsectors (sXct = s
X
dt = s
X
NPt = 1=3).
With the calibrated values, however, Northern taxes on the polluting good
cannot postpone the disaster even in the exogenous growth case. So as
36Comparing the increase in temperature between the rst-best and the second-best in
the open economy case is interesting. The temperature is initially higher in the rst-best
because the Souths emission rate is higher, but since the switch to clean innovation occurs
sooner, the temperature decreases faster.
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Figure 4: Temperature increase with and without directed technical change (di¤erent
capital shares than in the baseline scenario:  = 0:7;  = 0:1). From left to right: gures
3.A and 3.B.
to better illustrate the impact of DTC, I perform the same exercise but
now assume that  = 0:7 and  = 0:1. (A larger di¤erence in capital
shares limits the pollution haven e¤ect in a static model and therefore better
illustrates how it is amplied by the innovation response.) Figure 4 shows
that DTC accelerates the disaster under laissez-faire because it accelerates
the economys growth rate. With DTC, a disaster cannot be postponed with
a combination of positive carbon tax and tax on dirty research in the North:
in fact the combination that minimizes CO2 emissions is no taxes. Without
DTC, it is possible to delay an environmental disaster for up to 30 years
with this policy because the dynamic pollution haven e¤ect that this paper
emphasizes is absent. Here, the second-best policy can avoid a disaster both
with and without DTC, but without DTC, the increase in temperature is
much larger despite a much lower growth rate and a large trade tax must
be permanently maintained in order to reverse the pattern of trade.
In fact, there are parameters for which unilateral policies cannot prevent
a disaster without DTC, regardless of initial environmental quality. To avoid
a disaster, the North should be able to produce good P relying mostly on
clean technologies and to force the South to asymptotically fully specialize
in sector NP . The most extreme way for the North to do this is to produce
only good P (with nearly only the clean input) and to give it for free to
the South. Yet, without DTC, the ratio of relative productivities stay the
same over time, so if initially the South has a large comparative advantage
in sector P , or if clean technologies in the North are su¢ ciently backward,
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this is not enough to push the South towards full specialization and to avoid
a disaster. This thought experiment demonstrates that innovations ability
to a¤ect comparative advantage is essential in deriving the previous results.
5. Knowledge Di¤usion
I now relax the assumption that productivity improvements are entirely
country specic. In reality, some productivity improvements cross borders,
mitigating the amplication of comparative advantage e¤ect, which partly
drove the previous results.37 This brings into question the robustness of the
previous analysis. Here I consider an extension of the original model whereby
the lagging country can benet from the di¤usion of innovations produced
in the leading country, while Appendix A.18 considers a di¤erent extension
where innovation is undertaken by multinational rms so that technologies
are the same in both countries.
To model knowledge di¤usion in a simple way, I assume that, at the begin-
ning of every period, the country with the less advanced average productivity
in a given sector can partially catch up exogenously. That is, before any in-
novation occurs, the producer of intermediate i in sector z 2 fc; d;NPg gains
access to the technology AXzit = max((A
 X
z(t 1)=A
X
z(t 1))

; 1)AXzi(t 1), where

 2 [0; 1] measures the strength of the technological di¤usion. This equality
then delivers the following law of motion for aggregate productivity:
AXzt =
 
1 + 
 
sXzt
1 
max

A Xz(t 1)=A
X
z(t 1)


; 1

AXz(t 1)
for z 2 fc; d;NPg. Under this formulation, the ratio of the technological lev-
els across countries cannot diverge: as soon as one country acquires a strong
advantage over the other one, the catching-up process ensures that this dif-
ference is reduced in the next period. Unless factor endowments are signif-
icantly di¤erent across countries, this limits considerably the scope for full
specialization. Yet, the main intuitions of the baseline model carry through.
37One should not expect all productivity improvement to cross borders easily, because
some may be embedded in capital or may depend on local know-how. Dechezleprêtre et al.
(2011) suggest that clean technology transfers between developing and developed countries
exist but are limited: for the period 20002005, only 15 percent of the clean innovations
were patented in more than one country; this is slightly less than the share (17 percent)
of all innovations patented in more than one country.
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Northern policies that foster clean innovation in the North now also in-
crease the productivity of clean Southern technologies. They may even put
the South on a clean innovation track. If, in some period, pre-innovation
clean Southern technologies become more advanced than dirty ones (i.e., for
some t, ASct > ASdt), market forces will induce more clean than dirty inno-
vations in the South from that period onwards. Preventing a disaster does
not necessarily involve pushing the South toward specializing in sector NP
any more; it can also be achieved by ensuring a switch to clean innovation
there. That transition will occur if more scientists are allocated to clean tech-
nologies in the North than to dirty technologies in the South for a su¢ cient
amount of time. Clean innovation in the North and dirty innovation in the
South enter a horse race, which determines whether or not good P will be
produced in a clean way in the long-run. Who wins depends on the policies
that the North allows for and on the pattern of comparative advantage, much
as in Section 3, which leads to the following result (proof in Appendix A.17).
Proposition 6. Assume that initially: (i) technologies are su¢ ciently close
to each other across countries, that  is su¢ ciently small, and that the
spillovers 
 are su¢ ciently strong; (ii) the South is relatively well-endowed
in capital, KS=LS > KN=LN ; and (iii) clean technologies are su¢ ciently less
advanced than dirty ones (ASc0=A
S
d0 su¢ ciently small). Then no combination
of a carbon tax and a tax on dirty research in the North can prevent a disaster
irrespective of how high initial environmental quality S0 is.
This proposition mirrors Proposition 2. Assumption (i) implies that tech-
nology levels remain su¢ ciently close to each other across countries. When
combined with assumption (ii), it ensures that the South maintains its com-
parative advantage in sector P (before the implementation of a carbon tax).
Assumption (iii) plays the same role as in Proposition 2, ensuring that, when
the South has the comparative advantage in sector P , it innovates there more
than the North does. Since a carbon tax in the North can only reinforce the
Souths comparative advantage in P (and in fact, a carbon tax still increases
Southern innovation in sector P ), there are more Southern scientists innovat-
ing in dirty technologies than Northern scientists innovating in clean ones.
Hence Southern clean productivity ASct never catches up, so a switch in the
South to clean innovation never occurs. Intuitively, the Northern market for
good P is too small to generate enough clean innovations.
When the South is identied with non-Annex I countries, assumption (ii)
seems less likely to hold relative to its counterpart in Proposition 2, which
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only stipulates that the South has a comparative advantage in sector P
though it may hold if one interprets LX as human capital and not simply
labor. In fact, if the North has a large endowments-comparative advantage
in sector P (that is for
 
KN=LN

=
 
KS=LS

large enough) and knowledge
spillovers are strong enough, it can prevent a disaster using a combination of a
carbon tax and a tax on dirty research for su¢ ciently high S0. One may then
argue that knowledge spillovers weaken the conclusion that Annex I countries
could not prevent worldwide emissions from growing using a carbon tax only.
Yet assumption (ii) could also be more generally interpreted as assuming that
the South has a comparative advantage in P for reasons beyond imitable
technological factors, which could include factor endowments (capital, labor
but also natural resources), policies, di¤erent market distortions, etc... This
broader interpretation is more likely to hold, in which case the conclusion
that Annex I countries could not prevent worldwide emissions from growing
without research subsidies would be reinforced.
Indeed, as before, a temporary combination of clean research subsidies
and a tari¤ can prevent a disaster for su¢ ciently large initial environmental
quality (i.e., Proposition 3 still holds). Clean research subsidies can reallocate
Northern innovation to clean technologies, and a tari¤ can limit Southern
innovation in dirty technologies. Then ASct grows faster than ASdt, and a
switch to clean innovation eventually occurs in the South.38
Table 2: Welfare cost in the presence of knowledge spillovers
First-best Second-best

 = 0:4 (%) 5.71 6.92

 = 0:8 (%) 5.95 6.58
The structures of the rst-best and second-best policies are broadly simi-
lar, but the trade tax and subsidies for research must take knowledge spillovers
into account, and the second-best policy may prevent a disaster with a South
exporting good P in the long-run. In addition, the welfare costs of unilateral
38Remark 1 no longer holds when clean and dirty inputs are imperfect substitutes. Be-
cause of knowledge spillovers the ratio ASct=A
S
dt cannot approach zero if the North allocates
all its scientists to clean technologies, so that the South always allocate some scientists
to clean technologies. ASct becomes greater than A
S
dt at some t, after which a switch to
clean innovation occurs in the South. Remark 1 still holds if " = 1, or with a di¤erent
innovation function which does not satisfy the Inada condition (such as  ((s+ )  )
with  > 0).
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intervention are typically lower than without knowledge spillovers. Indeed,
the reversal in comparative advantages, which generated the large welfare
cost in the no-spillover case, may not happen, and even if it does, is much
less costly since the South ends up beneting from the technologies that the
North had developed. Accordingly, Table 2 shows the welfare costs in the
rst-best and the second-best cases with knowledge spillovers (
 = 0:4 and

 = 0:8): the welfare costs of the rst-best policy are very similar to those
in Table 1, but those of the second-best policy are much lower.39
To some extent, technological di¤usion itself is a parameter that can
be a¤ected by policy: laxer intellectual property rights, direct nancing of
projects abroad, or migrations of skilled workers could all contribute to a
faster di¤usion of technology. Therefore, according to the analysis presented
here, the di¤usion of clean technologies from North to South renders a tari¤
less necessary, and signicantly reduces the costs of a unilateral policy.
5.1. An extended model: knowledge spillovers, nontradables and di¤erent en-
dowments of scientists
The inclusion of knowledge spillovers allows to obtain non-trivial results
when the economy also features a nontradable sector. I now assume that
nal consumption is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of nontradable (CXNT ) and
tradable goods (CXT ), where the consumption share of tradables is given by
a, that is:
CX =
 
CXT
a  
CXNT
1 a
: (29)
Both goods are produced according to (2), with the associated goods P and
NP (and the associated subsectors c and d), but for the nontradable good,
the polluting and non-polluting inputs must be sourced locally. The same
intermediates are used whether the good is produced for the tradable or non-
tradable sector. In the no-spillovers case, it is impossible to prevent a disaster
because Southern emissions from nontradables will increase unboundedly re-
gardless of Northern policy. In addition, I allow for the mass of scientists in
the South (sS) and the North to di¤er (sN). For simplicity, I focus on the case
where the clean and dirty inputs are perfect substitutes (" = 1).40 I intro-
39Here, the reversal of comparative advantage still takes place in the presence of knowl-
edge spillovers because the di¤erence in factor endowments is small.
40Focusing on this case allows to write a simpler proposition. It is possible to generalize
the results provided that the initial ratio ASc0=A
S
d0 is small enough.
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duce the notations d  1 +

1
(1 )(1 a)   1
  1
1 
and d = 1 +

1
(1 a)   1
 1
1 
,
such that d > d > 1. Propositions 2 and 3 are then modied according to
the following proposition (proof in Appendix A.19).
Proposition 7. Assume that  is su¢ ciently small and that dirty technolo-
gies are initially more advanced than clean ones in both countries.
a) No combination of a carbon tax and a tax on dirty research in the North
can prevent a disaster irrespective of how high initial environmental quality
S0 is, provided that knowledge spillovers 
 are strong enough and
-either i) the South is relatively well-endowed in capital (KS=LS > KN=LN)
and sS  sN ;
- or ii)
 
KN=KS
  
LN=LS
1 
is small enough,
 
KN=KS
  
LN=LS
1 
is
large enough, and sN=sS < d=d.
b) A combination of a carbon tax and a tax on dirty research in the North
can prevent a disaster if S0 is high enough and sN=sS > d=d.
c) Research subsidies in the North alone can prevent a disaster if S0 is high
enough and sN=sS > 1=d.
d) Unilateral policies can never prevent a disaster if sN=sS < 1=d.
Therefore, the logic of Proposition 2 carries through. A carbon tax is
generally unable to prevent a disaster particularly when the South has a
large comparative advantage in sector P . It is only if the North has much
more innovation resources than the South that such a policy may succeed
regardless of the pattern of comparative advantage. In addition, since d=d
increases in a, a larger share of tradables makes it more likely that a carbon
tax fails. Proposition 3 survives as long as the North innovation resources are
not too small relative to the South. Otherwise, and especially if the share
of tradables is small, it may be impossible to prevent a disaster with any
unilateral policies, as the South innovates more in dirty for its nontradable
sector than the North innovates in clean, preventing clean technologies from
catching up.41
41The assumptions that  is small and that " = 1 allow to derive exacts expressions
regarding the thresholds d=d, 1=d and 1=d, otherwise the expressions are more complicated
(see the proof). Part c) of the proposition characterizes a range of parameters for which a
disaster can be avoided with research subsidies only, allowing for a trade tax expands this
range (within the limit of part d).
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6. Conclusion
On the backdrop of a literature on trade and the environment, which
has largely ignored innovation, this paper presents a simple model which
puts innovation at the center. It shows that when evaluating the long-
term consequences of unilateral environmental policies, it is essential to con-
sider their impact on the allocation of innovation within the polluting sector
between technologies (clean/dirty) and between countries (intervening/non-
intervening). The propositions in the text model-specic but they allow to
illustrate fundamental intuitions. First, the pollution haven e¤ect becomes
worse in a dynamic setting. Positive taxes on the polluting sector in the
North risk placing the economy on a path that leads to the South having
a comparative advantage in the polluting sector. This leads to the reloca-
tion of not only the production of the polluting good but also of innovation
in that sector, which dramatically hampers the benets of such a policy on
worldwide emissions. The South innovates more in dirty technologies, while
innovation in clean technologies in the North does not take o¤ because the
market share for the polluting sector is reduced. Second, sustainable growth
can be achieved without cooperation from the South, but this requires a
green industrial policy(with clean research subsidies and perhaps a trade
tax) in order to ensure that there is more clean than dirty innovation world-
wide. Such a policy can guarantee that either the North acquires a long-run
comparative advantage in the polluting sector, or, with knowledge spillovers,
that a switch towards clean innovation occurs in the South.
Therefore, in practice, the paper argues that unilateral environmental
policies should be devoted to developing clean technologies, which have the
potential to reduce emissions in the North, but also in the South either
through technology di¤usion or by slowing down the move of polluting in-
dustries there. These policies should be thought of as transitory until a
satisfactory global agreement is reached. The paper aims at analyzing what
well-intentioned countries should do until then, and therefore, as a rst
step, it has taken as given the absence of such an agreement. The next logi-
cal step is to analyze why some countries are willing to participate and others
are not, and how unilateral policies shape their intentions in the long-run.
This is, however, a complex issue as the incentive to sign a global agreement
depends on the benet that the reluctant country would get from it. Uni-
lateral policies can a¤ect this potential benet in at least three dimensions:
by decreasing environmental damages which discourages a reluctant country
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from joining (the free-rider problem), by developing clean technologies which
can di¤use and therefore reduce the costs of an environmental policy for the
reluctant country, and by a¤ecting comparative advantages and therefore the
impact of a potential environmental policy on the reluctant countrys terms
of trade (as analyzed in a static framework by Copeland and Taylor, 2005).
Another aspect left for future research is to study policies that directly
boost technological di¤usion. Such policies (e.g., the clean development
mechanism) are already part of climate negotiations. Studying technolog-
ical di¤usion would, however, require a proper model of intellectual property
rights (IPR), whose impact on emissions is ambiguous. On the one hand,
laxer IPR could lead to more rapid di¤usion of clean technologies to the
South, which would facilitate the switch to a clean path there. On the other
hand, they might reduce the incentives to develop Northern clean technolo-
gies in the rst place. Finally, the papers results suggest that directed tech-
nical change renders Southern emissions much more responsive to Northern
policies in the long run. This nding calls into question existing estimates of
the carbon leakage rate obtained from static models. To properly evaluate
the impact of local carbon taxes and carbon tari¤s, numerical models of the
world economy should incorporate directed technical change.
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